Nature is no great mother who has borne us. She is our creation. It is in our brain that she quickens to life. Things are because we see them, and what we see, and how we see it, depends on the Arts that have influenced us. To look at a thing is very different from seeing a thing. One does not see anything until one sees its beauty. Then, and then only, does it come into existence. At present, people see fogs, not because there are fogs, but because poets and painters have taught them the mysterious loveliness of such effects. There may have been fogs for centuries in London. I dare say there were. But no one saw them, and so we do not know anything about them. They did not exist till Art had invented them.
Differance is the simultaneous coming-to-presence of beings and their withdrawal. It is the deferral of presence and presencing. And this is precisely what the relation between virtual proper being and local manifestation is. Things are these processes of differance. Beings are like blooming flowers, yet are blooms that always hold themselves in reserve, such that there will never be any final presence, completion, or parousia. And this differance has no need of God or a subject to take place. Being blooms in and of its own accord. Nor is there any eschatology, teleology, or final point where being coincides with itself, exhausting withdrawal.
Going meta is a great way to sneer at someone. You remove the rug from underneath the other’s feet. Their mere immediacy is always false. It’s the deep structure, the numinous background, the possibility of the possibility of the horizon of the event, that is more real, better, or just more rhetorically effective, than anything else. In this mode, the egg of potentiality comes before the chicken of the actual …
The syndrome of going meta is repeated in countless different philosophical modes. I’m not sure which part came first, the thinking or the acting out, but this meta syndrome seems strangely parallel with the basic ontology of modern life. Such is the syndrome deeply responsible for the beautiful soul condition from which we mock anyone who dares to actually do something—the condition Lacan noted when he claimed “Les non-dupes errent” (“Those who [assume they] are not duped are making a mistake[…]”“and “The No of the father,” “Le non du père”). Those who sit up high on the mountain looking down at us poor saps beneath, because they think they can see through everything, are the most deluded of all. Since, as I’ve argued, the beautiful soul is the mode of consumerism—the default subjective framework since 1800—we can expect the meta syndrome to be pervasive in culture.